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Pinnell: Antitrust Policy and Taxation.

ANTITRUST POLICY AND TAXATION
GARY PINNELL
The goal both of the antitrust statutes and of the tax laws is economic
regulation and stabilization. Antitrust laws work toward this goal by promoting competition, while tax laws, ,besides their function of raising Tevenue,
encourage private investment and stimulate productivity. By working in
harmony, the maximum effect of antitrust policy and tax policy can be
achieved. But several recent developments have brought ,antitrust policy and
taxation into conflict, the result being a lessening of the efficiency of both.
These conflicts have arisen because of the tendency to equate antitrust
damages with other types of injuries. Although antitrust violations are tor'tious in nature,' they are not sufficiently analogous to conventional torts to
allow accurate parallels to be drawn or to permit similar treatment for tax
purposes. Antitrust actions arise only where there is a statutory violation;
most conventional tort actions !arise under common law principles. When the
antitrust violation is proved, the damages sustained must be automatically
tripled; 2 in conventional tort situations, the amount of the damages awarded
is left solely to the trier of fact. These two -undamental differences indicate
the need for change in 'the tax consequences 'of antitrust proceedings for both
the antitrust plaintiff and defendant.
THE ANTITRUST PLAINTIFF

Tax policy determines the treatment of a plaintiff's antitrust recovery and
the deductibility of its litigation expenses. This treatment will directly affect
the most important decision 'to 'be made by the plaintiff- whether or not
to prosecute the claim.
Legal Expenses

Counsel fees, court costs, and other litigation expenses incurred by a taxpayer in connection with or proximately 'esulting from the -taxpayer's trade
or business are deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses. 3 For
1. E.g., Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 311 F.2d
other grounds, 377 U.S. 13 (1964).

764, 768 (9th Cir. 1963), rev'd on

2. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
3. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a); see Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S.
145, 151-53 (1928). See generally McDonald, Deduction of Attorney's Fees for Federal
Income Tax Purposes, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 168 (1954).
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tax purposes the legal expenditures made by a successful antitrust plaintiff
are offset against his recovery. 4 Where the recovery is that it will be

fully included in gross income, the not result is that the legal expenses are
fully deductible. In those cases where the recovery is capital in nature, such
as damages for the ruin of the business, the legal expenses would be capitalized and therefore deductible only to the extent of the capital gain recog-

nized. 5 Presumably, the entire cost of an unsuccessful litigation would be
deductible on the grounds that they proximately result from the taxpayer's

trade or business.
Characterof the Recovery

In an antitrust action the successful plaintiff may recover damages for the
loss of profits, overpayments made on the purchase of price-fixed equipment

or inventory, 'treble damages, damages for the ruin of -the business or injury
to its goodwill, or ,acombination of these.6 Each of these types of damages
gives rise to varying tax consequences. It may be stated that damages received for the loss of profits 7 :and the punitive portion of treble damages8
generally are ordinary income, but damages for injury to goodwill are a capital recovery and therefore non-taxable. 9

Had -the profits, lost due to the defendant's anticompetitive conduct, -been
received through the ordinary course of business, they would have been taxed
as ordinary income. 10 The mere fact that they were finally received as a
4. See Estate of Meade v. Commissioner, 489 F.2d 161, 165 (5th Cir. 1974); Peter
K. Pappas, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1209 (1962).
5. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 263, 265; cf. Rev. Rul. 67-125, 1967-1 CUM. BULL.
31. See generally Estate of Meade v. Commissioner, 489 F.2d 161, 165 (5th Cir. 1974),
rev'g 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 977 (1972).
6. See generally Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955) (treble damages); Thomson v. Commissioner, 406 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1969) (lost
profits and injury to business); Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110,
113 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 779 (1944) (ruin of business); Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 912, 913 (6th Cir. 1932) (loss of business goodwill); Rev. Rul. 68-378, 1968-2 CUM. BULL. 335 (overcharge on electrical equipment).
7. See, e.g., Sager Glove Corp. v. Commissioner, 311 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 373 U.S. 910 (1963); Commercial Elec. Supply Co., 8 B.T.A. 986, 992

(1927).

See also INT.

REV. CODE OF

1954, § 186(a).

8. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955), rev'g 211 F.2d 928
(3d Cir. 1954); Commissioner v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 217 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 982 (1955); William Basle, 26 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 635 (1957),
affd per curiam, 256 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1958); John E. Bloom, 25 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
184 (1956); see Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14(a) (1965). See generally Koenig, Federal Taxation of Private Antitrust Recovery, 13 STAN. L. REV. 264, 278-81 (1961); Note, Taxation of Damage Recoveries from Litigation, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 345 (1955).
9. Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110, 113 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 779 (1944); Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 912,
913 (6th Cir. 1932).
10. Although used here in the singular, there may be more than one defendant.
The usual antitrust action involves a "conspiracy" to harm the plaintiff through anti-
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result of legal action should not change their character. The logic for this
treatment is perhaps the most clearly understood precept in the entire 'area
of tax treatment of antitrust damages.
The rationale becomes more obscure, however, when considering other
types of recoveries. The test to be applied in determining the tax treatment
of the recovery is "[iln lieu of what were the damages awarded?"" If the
recovery is for damage to the goodwill of the business, then the proceeds are
a non-taxable ireturn of capital to the extent of the plaintiff's basis in its goodwill. 12 Amounts received in excess of the value of the goodwill l3 constitute
14

taxable income.
There will ordinarily be two situations where the taxpayer claims damage
to goodwill-where the business is totally destroyed due to the defendant's
anticompetitive conduct, and where the business is partially destroyed, or a
particular product line is injured. A good example of the first situation was
considered in Raytheon Production Corp. v. Commissioner," where a manufacturer of radio rectifying tubes charged that RCA had entered into a
conspiracy to monopolize the business of selling such tubes with the result
that Raytheon's business had rapidly diminished.' 6 Although Raytheon
competitive practices, price fixing or price discrimination. It is relatively rare that a
single offender will have the requisite economic power to injure the plaintiff. Therefore
textual references to a single defendant should be understood to include one or more
defendants.
11. Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110, 113 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 779 (1944). See also Rev. Proc. 67-33, § 3.02, 1967-2 CuM. BULL. 659,
660.
12. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1932).
See also Michael Berbiglia, 20 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 400, 404 (1951).
13. Goodwill has been defined as the capitalized earning power of the business less
the value of the tangible assets. See George W. Staab, 20 T.C. 834, 840 (1953). See
also Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110, 113 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 779 (1944).
Indetermining the possible capital gain to be recognized by the antitrust plaintiff, it
isentirely possible that the goodwill has a basis of zero or isnonexistent. In the first
instance, the recovery would be taxable as a long-term capital gain inits
entirety. See
R.J. Durkee, 18 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 610, 612 (1949), ajI'd men?., 181 F.2d 189 (6th
Cir. 1950) (on remand). If there is no goodwill, the recovery will be ordinary income
because of the lack of a capital injury. In Abraham Moulton, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
624 (1962), a liquor dealer was found to have no goodwill. The settlement received
to compromise a price discrimination suit was held to represent the nuisance value of
the suit since there was no damage to the business as a going concern. Id. at 627.
14. In non-antitrust actions, the treatment of the excess will be capital gain. See
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1231(a); R.J. Durkee, 18 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 610 (1949),
aff'd, 181 F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1950); cf. Paul v. United States, 30 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d
5724 (S.D. I11.
1972).
15. 144 F.2d 110 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.779 (1944).
16. Id. at 113-14. In 1926, Raytheon was doing 80 percent of the rectifying tube
business in the United States, and showed profits that year of more than $450,000. By
1927, RCA, which owned or controlled the patents on almost all the practical radio circuits entered into licensing agreements with other iadio manufacturers requiring the
use of RCA tubes in the radio sets. This tying practice, coupled with RCA's monopoly
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alleged both loss of its goodwill and loss of profits, -the latter allegation was
17
found to be merely evidentiary.
Raytheon held the taxpayer's recovery in excess of its basis in its goodwill
was taxable as ordinary income.18 It is important to note that when Raytheon was decided, capital gains were taxed at ordinary rates; 19 under present
2°
law, the excess would be taxed as any other capital gain.
The few cases which have allowed the taxpayer to treat his recovery -as
a return of capital have been strongly criticized. 21 The gravamen of the criticism seems to be that the partial destruction of the business is really a loss
of present and future profits. Because the plaintiff's business has only been
weakened, and the weakening may not be permanent, the damages recovered

should be treated as lost profits rather than as a capitalization of profits.
While it is true that the defendant's anticompetitive practice causes the injured plaintiff to lose profits, this argument overlooks the fact that lost market
share is not so easily regained. Had Raytheon's business been only damaged,
rather than collapsed by RCA's monopolistic tying arrangement, the critics
would declare that Raytheon's recovery should have been treated as lost profits. But Raytheon, as a result of its "superior skill, industry and foresight,"' 22 'had served 80 percent of the market before RCA tied radio 'tubes
to patent licenses. RCA, however, would still have had a commanding
share of the market, even after it was ordered to stop its anticompetitive practices. 2' RCA's market share would thus be attributable 'to the continuing
effects of its antitrust violations which had since stopped, rather than to its
power, so cornered the market on rectifying tubes that Raytheon's profits fell to

$150,000 in 1927. By 1928, they were a scant $10,000.
17. The court found that:
This was not the sort of antitrust suit where the plaintiff's business still exists and
where the injury was merely for loss of profits. The allegations and evidence as
to the amount of profits were necessary in order to establish the value of the goodwill and the business since that is derived by a capitalization of profits.
Id. at 113; accord, Durkee v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 184, 186 (6th Cir. 1947).
18. Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 779 (1944).
19. Capital gains were included in gross income to the extent that they exceeded
capital losses. Revenue Act of 1938, § 117, 52 Stat. 502.
20. See R.J. Durkee, 18 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 610, 614 (1949), aff'd, 181 F.2d 189
(6th Cir. 1950).
21. Noall & Troxell, Tax Aspects of Antitrust Proceedings, 18 TAx L. REV. 213,
240-42 (1963) (advocating return of capital treatment only where the taxpayer's business is totally destroyed). But see Koenig, Federal Taxation of Private Antitrust Recovery, 13 STAN. L. REV. 264, 265-69 (1961).
22. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
23. Vacuum tubes are a product in whch there is no real product differentiation.
The same type of tube is interchangeable with any other brand, and the circuit will function as well with Brand X as Brand Y. The competition, then, must be based on price
and customer prejudice toward a certain manufacturer. Further, all other factors being
equal, customer buying patterns are often based on habit. Therefore consumers accustomed to buying RCA rectifying tubes would probably continue to buy from RCA even
after Raytheon's ability to compete was restored.
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skill, foresight and industry. This would -undoubtedly result in lower profits
to Raytheon; this loss of profits, however, would be for an indefinite period
of time. Return on capital investment would also be lowered. It may be
said that this is an -injury to capital which could adequately -be compensated
only as a return of capital, and -thata loss of profits was implicit in the capital

injury and not ,the injury itself. 24 Even so, the requirement
return of capital will be ,allowed seems to rest primarily on
-nature of the damages received (the "in lieu of what" ,test)
tion of the itaxpayer's business.
Treatment of damages as return of capital is also allowed
was caused by an overcharge on a capital asset due to a

to be met before
two factors-the
and the destrucwhere the injury
price-fixing con-

spiracy. 2 5 The compensatory portion of the recovery represents the amount
of the overcharge, so the basis of 'the asset is reduced by 'the amount of the

-award. If the asset is subject to depreciation or amortization, and the award
is greater than the adjusted basis of the asset, the recovery is first applied
to the adjusted basis, reducing it to zero. 26

The excess is ordinary income

because it represents a recapture of the depreciation or amortization taken.
The Punitive Portion of Treble Damages

A suit to recover damages for violation of the antitrust laws is brought
under Section 4 of the Clayton Act which provides that the damages

awarded are to be automatically trebled. 2 7 Trebling of the damages is not
elective with either the court or the plaintiff, nor is it an additional amount
to be -awarded in the case of an especially flagrant violation; it is manda-

24. A second analysis is possible: Had Raytheon decided to sell its business, the
price would have been the value of the net assets (the value of tangible assets and certain
intangibles such as patents less liabilities) plus some amount to represent the capitalized
earning power of the business. Where these future earnings were lessened through a
loss of market share, the value of the business accordingly decreased. This would be
an injury to capital caused by a loss of profits; attributing the recovery to a loss of profits would leave the true injury uncompensated.
A similar analysis was used by the court in Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1932):
IT]he true measure of damages was compensation to be determined by ascertaining
how much less valuable its business was by reason of the wrongful acts of [the defendant] . . . . Injury to its business of course means injury to its financial standing, credit, reputation, good will, capital, and other possible elements. Profits were
one of the chief indications of the worth of the business; but the usual earnings
before the injury, as compared with those afterward, were only an evidential factor
in determining actual loss and not an independent basis for recovery.
Id. at 913.
25. Rev. Proc. 67-33, 1967-2 CuM. BULL. 659.
26. Id. §§ 4.02, 4.03; Rev. Rul. 68-378, 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 335. The inclusion of
the excess over adjusted basis in gross income is only to the extent that the recovery
represents an earlier tax benefit. See Rev. Proc. 67-33, § 4.03, 1967-2 CuM. BULL. 659,
661; INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 111; Treas. Reg. § 1.111-1 (1960).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
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tory. 28 The punitive two-thirds of the treble damages was tax exempt until
1955 when the Supreme Count, in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 29
analogized the damages received in an antitrust action to those received for
a personal injury: "Damages for personal injury are by definition compensatory only," but "[p]unitive damages . . . cannot be considered a restoration
'
of capital for taxation purposes. "30
When ,the character of treble damages is considered, a problem with treating treble damage recoveries as ordinary income arises. Numerous antitrust
cases have held that the provision for trebling damages is not punitive, but
2
31
In Maltz v. Sax,. the Count of
rather remedial -and compensatory. '
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit said that "[tlhis grant to persons damageda cause of action for treble damages-was for the purpose of multiplying the
agencies which would help enforce the [Sherman Act] and therefore make
it more effective."3' 3 The use of treble damages to encourage private antitrust suits and ,to encourage private plaintiffs to "bear a considerable amount
28. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) reads,
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent,
without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
29. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
30. Id. at 432 n.8. Although Glenshaw Glass arose from damages received as a
result of an antitrust action, its results are not so limited. The non-taxable status of
all punitive awards was changed.
The post-Glenshaw Glass cases have steadfastly followed this approach. E.g., Thomson v. Commissioner, 406 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1969), aII'g 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
1317 (1965); William Basle, 26 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 635 (1957), alf'd per curiam, 256
F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1958); John E. Bloom, 25 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 184 (1956). See also
Commissioner v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 217 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 982 (1955) (foreshadowing the result in Glenshaw Glass).
31. An action under Section 7 of the Sherman Act, which was replaced by Section
4 of the Clayton Act, is not an action for a penalty or forfeiture, but is one for the
enforcement of a civil remedy for a private injury, compensatory in its purpose and effect. City of Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works, 127 F. 23, 28-29 (6th
Cir. 1903), afI'd, 203 U.S. 390 (1906). The following cases reached a similar result
under Section 4 of the Clayton Act: Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 117 F.
Supp. 747, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Electric Theater Co. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp., 113 F. Supp. 937, 942 (W.D. Mo. 1953); Momand v. Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp., 37 F. Supp. 649, 657 (W.D. Okla. 1941). Contra, Acme Precision Prods.,
Inc. v. American Alloys Corp., 347 F. Supp. 376, 380 (W.D. Mo. 1972); Johnson v.
Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 33 F. Supp. 176, 182 (E.D. Tenn. 1940), aft'd, 123 F.2d
1016 (6th Cir. 1941). See also Herald Co. v. Harper, 410 F.2d 125, 130-31 (8th Cir.
1969), holding that even if the treble damage provision was punitive in nature that
would not be sufficient to label it a criminal statute and make available constitutional
safeguards as in criminal prosecutions.
Whereas recent cases have been quick to find the treble damage provisions a penalty,
great weight should be given to the older cases which were decided in the same social,
economic and political melieu out of which the Sherman and Clayton Acts arose.
32. 134 F.2d 2 (7th Cir. 1943).
33. Id. at 4.
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of the burden and expense of enforcement and thus save 'the Government
time and money"'34 seems to be reinforced by the fact that the remedy of
35
treble damages is not available to the government.
The view that treble damages are remedial in nature is supported by the
fact that the antitrust plaintiff usually recovers far less 'than 'his claimed dam,ages, even after the jury award has been increased 'threefold.3 6 Private antitrust 'actions are almost certain 'to be as protracted as they are expensive.
Even where the government has previously obtained a conviction or judgment
against the violator,37 the private claimant must still establish -the extent of
its damages. In the usual -situation, the extent of the damage incurred and
its effect of 'the plaintiff's future business are extremely difficult either -to discern or to prove.3 8 In short, the recovery is likely to be far less -than the
actual damage sustained, even after consideration of trebled damages.3 9
34. S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1955), cited in NoaU & TroxeU,
Tax Aspects of Antitrust Proceedings, 18 TAx L. REv. 213, 234 (1963).
35. Clayton Act, § 4A, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1970). The Government may only recover its actual damages.
36. Lee Loevinger, who later became the Assistant Attorney General in charge of
the Antitrust Division, summarized the plaintiff's risks and hardships that lead to the
inadequate recovery:
As a practical matter, a business victim of antitrust violation cannot undertake any
action for vindication of his rights unless he is willing and able to wait at least
two or three years-and often longer-for the decision of his case, is able to advance at least several thousand dollars in probable costs of preparing and presenting
his case, and is prepared to withstand the social and economic pressures and the
threat of reprisal and retaliation that not infrequently are the lot of the antitrust
plaintiff.
Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTITRUST BULL. 167,
170 (1958).
37. Under Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1970), a final judgment or decree in a civil or criminal action brought by the government is prima facie
evidence against the defendant in subsequent litigation brought by private plaintiffs who
are injured as a result of the defendant's anticompetitive conduct. This provision does
not apply to consent decrees entered into by the government and the defendant prior
to trial. Under this latter practice, the defendant who realizes it will lose its battle with
the government can take a consent decree, thereby leaving private claimants with the
burden of proving antitrust law violations. The prima facie proof aspects are illustrated
in Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558 (1951).
38. "[Even wheie the defendant by his own wrong has prevented a more precise
computation, the jury may not render a verdict based on speculation or guesswork."
Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946). The defendant may
try to show that the plaintiff passed on any overcharges to its customers. See Atlantic
City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 226 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Note, The Defense of "Passing On" in Treble Damage Suits Under the Antitrust Laws, 70 YALE L.J.
469 (1961). See generally Donovan & Irvine, Proof of Damages Under the Anti-Trust
Laws, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 511 (1940); Timberlake, The Legal Injury Requirements and
Proof of Damages in Treble Damage Actions Under the Antitrust Laws, 30 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 231 (1961).
39. In Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTITRUST
BULL. 167, 173 (1958), the following observation was made:
The treble damage recovery is sometimes referred to as something of a windfall for
plaintiffs. In actual practice this is not the case. It is virtually never possible for
a plaintiff to show by tangible evidence of the kind demanded by courts the full
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Labeling treble damages -as punitive is at variance with the traditional concepts of punitive damages. 40 Punitive damages are awarded to punish the
tortfeasor for his wrongdoing and vary according to the outrageousness of 'his
conduct. 4 1 The jury might not award punitive damages if it feels the tort
was inadvertent or non-malicious, but since antitrust treble damages are automatic, inadvertence is immaterial. In some jurisdictions punitive damages
may be -awarded to compensate for wounded feelings or for litigation expenses. 4 2 All these features of punitive damages are in stark contrast to the
"punitive" two-thirds of treble damages. 43 In apparent agreement, Revenue
Ruling 64-224 provides:
Actions brought under Section 4 of the Clayton Act are remedial in
nature since the purpose behind this section of the statute is to provide

the victim with a means of recovering damages inflicted, and not to
punish the wrongdoer, in the sense of a punishment . . .44

In this ruling it was held ,that treble damage payments made to private antitrust claimants are deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses .4 5
Since these same deductible damages are income to the recipient under the
theory that they represent a penalty windfall, and since in ,this revenue ruling
they were held not to be a penalty, this aspect of antitrust damage taxation
is a classic exercise in non sequitur. In ,the ordinary scheme of things, transactions which give rise to deductions by one taxpayer create income for another, 46 but here the risk and expense of antitrust litigation is shifted to the
amount of his damages. Further, the deprivation of business and profits over a long
period of time always involves a business handicap that is never taken into account
or compensated. The depreciated value of money is not taken into account. The
unrecoverable expenses of litigation are always very substantial. The time and
trouble of the plaintiff in pursuing his lawsuit are never considered. Finally, it is
almost always necessary for a plaintiff to pay a substantial part of any recovery
for legal expenses and attorneys' fees which are not fully compensated by any court
award. When all of these factors are taken into account, it would be a rare and
fortunate plaintiff who came out of an antitrust suit with a net recovery amounting
to full compensation for his actual damages.
40. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9-14
(1971); 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages §§ 236-42 (1965).
41. See, e.g., Bucher v. Krause, 200 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S.
997 (1953).
42. See, e.g., Wright Titus, Inc. v. Swafford, 133 S.W.2d 287, 294-95 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1939, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.).
43. Treble damage claims are also assignable. Momand v. Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp., 37 F. Supp. 649, 651-52 (W.D. Okla. 1941); see Paul v. United States, 30
Am. Fed. Tax. R.2d 5724 (S.D. Ill. 1972).
44. 1964-2 CuM. BULL. 52, 54. Payments made to the government under Section
4A of the Clayton Act, however, are punitive damages, not restitution. Id. at 54.
45. Id. But see INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(g) (disallowing the deductibility
of two-thirds of treble damages where defendant has been convicted of a criminal violation of the antitrust laws).
46. Depreciation deductions, for example, do not give rise to income because there
is no second party receiving anything. But the converse does not always hold tiue.
Amounts expended that represent income to the recipient may not be deductible by the
party making the payment, such as some legal expenses. An expense that may not be
deducted by the client is nonetheless income to the lawyer.
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injured party by the very logic used to ,aid the violator. It would indeed be
relevant to -ask who is being penalized.

The provisions of Revenue Ruling 64-224 have been suggested as the basis
for an argument that treble damages should not -be taxed to the recipient,
at least where the compensatory portion represents ,areturn of capital. 4 7 This
view is supportable if Glenshaw Glass is read narrowly: where the recovery
was for lost profits, the entire recovery should be ordinary imcome, but where
the injury -inflicted resulted in a return of capital, the trebled recovery should
be tax-free. 4 The Tax Court has not agreed with this -narrow reading of
Glenshaw Glass.49 The treatment of treble damages as punitive and their
taxation as ordinary income will probably continue until ,the harsh rule of
Glenshaw Glass is overruled by the courts or abrogated by Congress.
Section 186
Section 186 was -added to the Code as part of the Tax Reform Act of
196950 to provide some relief to -antitrust plaintiffs. 51 ,Under this provision,
a deduction is available to offset the unrecovered net operating losses occasioned by the defendant's wrongful conduct. 52 In the tax disposition of the
treble damages, however, only one-third of the recovery is considered to ,be
compensatory ,and therefore eligible for deduction under section 1,86. 5.3 The
other two-thirds, the so-called punitive portion, is ordinary income and fully
taxable, 54 notwithstanding the possibility that the compensable portion is less
than the unrecovered losses.
There are two most critical parts of section 186. First is the necessity that
there be 'an unrecovered net operating loss, because injuries inflicted on the
taxpayer which cause merely a loss of profits are inadequate unless a net
operating loss results. 55 The other is the requirement that the recovery be
pursuant to 'a civil action filed against the violator making the payment. 56
47. Boland, Income Tax Treatment of Antitrust Damages, 22 TAx L. REV. 47, 66
(1965).
48. Koenig, Federal Taxation of Private Antitrust Recovery, 13 STAN. L. REV. 264,
279 (1961).
49. Ralph Freeman, 33 T.C. 323 (1959); Chalmers Cullins, 24 T.C. 322 (1955);
cf. Rev. Rul. 58-418, 1958-2 CuM. BULL. 18.
50. Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 904, 83 Stat. 711.
51. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 186. See generally 34 AM. JuR. 2d Federal Taxation
5263-64, at 216-17 (1974); Taggart, Fines, Penalties, Bribes and Damage Payments and Recoveries, 25 TAx L. REv. 611, 628-37 (1970). The Taggart article was
published before the regulations for section 186 were promulgated.
52. The wrongful conduct isnot limited to antitrust actions, but includes patent infringement, breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 186(b).
53. Treas. Reg. § 1.186-1(c)(1) (1972).
54. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14(a) (1965).
55. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 186(a).
56. Id.§ 186(b)(3). In Treas. Reg. § 1.186-1(c)(3)(i) (1972), an "action" for
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This latter criterion seems out of place because it precludes settlements made
before the institution of an action. Consequently, the antitrust plaintiff must
go 'through the motions and expense of a possibly needless lawsuit. Public
policy, which favors settlements in order to avoid increasing the burdens of
a crowded court docket, is thus thwarted by this .requirement.
The expenses of recovery, which necessarily include legal expenses, must
be allocated between the punitive and compensatory portions of the recovery. 57 The recovery expenses attributable to the deductible compensable
injury aie offset against the section 186 deduction chiefly because any other
treatment would result in 'a double deduction.
Allocation of Damages in Settlements

When an out of court settlement is made between the parties to an antitrust
action, 'the settlement usually recites an allocation of the damages between
'an injury 'to the plaintiff's goodwill, loss of profits, and punitive damages.58
Neither the Commissioner nor the courts is bound by the allocation in the
settlement. 59 Similarly, if the settlement fails to make an allocation, one will

be made by the court, 60 and it will -be overturned on appeal only where it
is shown that the allocation made by 'the lower court was "clearly erroneous."8

1

In determining the reasonableness of the allocation and in making an initial allocation if none was made by the partiesi the court will look both to
the pleadings filed in the antitrust suit 62 and to the record of the ,trial itself."'
the purposes of triggering section 186 is "considered as instituted upon completion of
service of process. . . upon all defendants who pay or incur an obligation to pay a compensatory amount."
57. Treas. Reg. § 1.186-1(c)(4) (1972). In a treble damage action, one-third of
the recovery will be considered to be the compensatory amount. Id. § 1.186-1(c)(1).
Thus one-third of the expenses of recovery will be allocated to the compensatory
amount.
58. See, e.g., William Basle, 26 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 635 (1957), aff'd per curiam,
256 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1958).
59. William Basle, 26 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 635, 639 (1957), affd per curiam, 256
F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1958). But ifthe settlement provisions are such that the tax effects
will be materially different for the parties where the allocations are changed, the Commissioner will be hard pressed to challenge the allocation. See Ullman v. Commissioner, 264 F.2d 305, 308 (2d Cir. 1959) ("[tlax avoidance desires . . .are ordinarily
antithetical, forcing them, in most cases, to agree upon a treatment which reflects the
parties' true intent .... ").
60. Glenshaw Glass Co., 18 T.C. 860, 871 (1952), aff'd, 211 F.2d 928 (3d Cir.
1954), rev'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
61. Thomson v.Commissioner, 406 F.2d 1006, 1010 (9th Cir. 1969), afj'g 34 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem.1317 (1965). The allocation isarbitrary and erroneous if there isa clear
demonstration of capital injury, coupled with damages received for lost profits, and the
Tax Court treated the full recovery as ordinary income because there was no allocation
in the settlement. Durkee v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 184, 187 (6th Cir. 1947).
62. Paul v. United States, 30 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5724, 5725 (S.D. Ill. 1972);
Chalmers Cullins, 24 T.C. 322, 328 (1955); Glenshaw Glass Co., 18 T.C. 860, 868
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A complaint alleging only lost profits will not support a stipulation in the settlement that all or part of the payment is made 'to compensate the plaintiff
for an injury to goodwill. 64 Neither will 'the mere allegation that the plaintiff
has sustained an injury to its goodwill uphold a settlement based at least
partly on ,that claim.6 5 In short, the taxpayer must be prepared to show that
the injury to goodwill was actually inflicted and that the settlement includes
a sum to recompense that injury.
The Tax Court had formerly attributed two-thirds of the recovery to taxable punitive damages if there was no allocation in the settlement; the
balance was allocated between lost profits 'and capital recovery. 66 But in
lone Thomson,6 7 where a claim was made in the antitrust complaint for both
lost profits and injury to 'the business, the Tax Court, apparently convinced
that there was a valid claim for 'the injury to the business, found half of the
compensatory portion of the recovery to be lost profits -and half to be a nontaxable return of capital. 68 The result has been changed by Revenue Procedure 67-33.69 The taxpayer is now aided by a presumption that no portion
of the settlement is for punitive damages where ,the settlement amount is less
than the compensatory damages -alleged in the antitrust suit.7 0
(1952), afj'd, 211 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1954), rev'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 426
(1955). See also Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 912, 913 (6th
Cir. 1932); cf. Rev. Rul. 58-418, 1958-2 CuM. BULL. 18.
In Abraham Moulton, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 624, 628 (1962), the Tax Court held:
[W]here an unallocated amount is received . . . in settlement of a legal action, the
determination as to the purpose of the payment received is controlled in the absence
of proof to the contrary by the nature of the claim made by the taxpayer which
was settled by the payment and the actual basis of recovery.
63. Sager Glove Corp. v. Commissioner, 311 F.2d 210, 211 (7th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 373 U.S. 910 (1963) (settlement was within $10 of amount corporation's president testified was loss in profits); cf. Abraham Moulton, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 624, 627
(1962) (limitations had run and barred the action; settlement held to be nuisance value
of the suit).
64. Cf. Nicholas W. Mathey, 10 T.C. 1099, 1104-05 (1948) (recovery for patent
infringement where theory of complaint was lost profits; taxpayer argued unsuccessfully
to Tax Court that recovery was a return of capital). But cf. Peter Kucera, 20 P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 262, 265 (1951) (settlement in patent infringement suit held to be additional
payments for sale of patents taxable as capital gain despite claim for treble damages in
suit).
65. Sager Glove Corp. v. Commissioner, 311 F.2d 210, 211 (7th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 373 U.S. 910 (1963); Peter K. Pappas, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1209, 1211
(1962). See also Estate of Carter, 298 F.2d 192 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 910
(1962).
66. See lone Thomson, 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1317, 1322 (1965), aif'd, 406 F.2d
1006 (9th Cir. 1969). But see Abraham Moulton, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 624, 628
(1962); Peter Kucera, 20 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 262, 265 (1951).
67. 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1317 (1965), aff'd, 406 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1969).
68. Id. at 1322.
69.

1967-2 CUM. BULL. 659.

70. Rev. Proc. 67-33, § 4.01, 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 659, 661. See Thomson v. Commissioner, 406 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1969). This presumption is only overcome
by clear evidence to the contrary.
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This indicates the importance of good planning in the complaint and settlement. The pleadings should emphasize the capital injury, and the settlement
should stipulate -that capital is sought ,to be recovered first, before -attributing

anything to lost profits or overcharges. 71 Negotiation records, conferences
and correspondence which refer to and emphasize the capital injury can be
valuable evidence to prove the reasonableness of the allocation. 72 For example, an entry on the company's books labeling the recovery as "injury to
company's business" has proved helpful although not determinative. 73 A
stipulation of some culpability on the part of the defendant might also aid
the taxpayer in demonstrating capital recovery. 74 The taxpayer should take
75
care, however, not to make the settlement allocations appear contrived.
THE ANTITRUST DEFENDANT

Federal income taxes also have an impact on the defendant in an antitrust
action, and, as with the plaintiff, tax and antitrust policy sometimes come
into conflict.
Legal Expenses

The deductibility of the defendant's legal expenses has been in a state of
considerable confusion. The Internal Revenue Service had originally ruled
71. The various causes of action against the same defendant should be clearly segregated. In one case, the complaint alleged both breach of contract and violation of state
antitrust laws. The Tax Court found the action to be based on contract and not antitrust, holding the settlement to be damages for breach of contract and taxable as ordinary income. Martin Bros. Box Co., 12 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 586, 591 (1943), ajf'd
mem., 142 F.2d 457 (6th Cir. 1944). In such cases, separate suits might be advisable
where they are not contrary to procedural rules of the forum.
72. See Martin Bros. Box Co., 12 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 586, 589-90 (1943), aff'd
mem., 142 F.2d 457 (6th Cir. 1944). See also Abraham Moulton, 31 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 624, 627 (1962), where negotiations centered primarily on treble damage aspects
and consequently the iecovery was held o dinary income.
The Commissioner is aided by a presumption of the correctness of his determinations.
Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). This presumption carries with it the additional presumption that the receipt in issue is ordinary income. H. Liebes & Co. v.
Commissioner, 90 F.2d 932, 935 (9th Cir. 1937). The Commissioner's presumptions
must be overcome by legally sufficient evidence to the contrary. See J.M. Perry & Co.
v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 123, 124 (9th Cir. 1941). For a discussion of these oresumptions and their corresponding burdens of proof in a different but analogous context
see Comment, Reasonable Needs of the Business: The Section 537 Question, 6 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 444, 466 (1974)
73. Telefilm, Inc., 21 T.C. 688, 692 (1954).
74. See Abraham Moulton, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 624, 627 (1962) (settlement held
ordinary income; recovery was found to be "nuisance value" of suit).
75. Overcaution seems to be at least oie of the reasons the taxpayer's settlement
allocation was not sustained in William Basle, 26 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 635 (1957), aff'd
per cuiam, 256 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1958). The taxpayer had not filed suit, and would
not settle except on the condition that three-fourths of the recovery was allocated to
goodwill. Id. at 636-37.
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that 'the legal fees paid by the antitrust violator in the unsuccessful defense
of a criminal action were deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses. 76 The Service subsequenitly reversed 'itself,77 however, holding that
counsel fees paid to defend a criminal antitrust prosecution were -not deductible on the grounds of public policy. This was later amplified by a holding
that the deductibility of legal expenses incurred in the unsuccessful defense
of civil claims brought by the government under Section 4A of the Clayton
78
Act or under the Federal False Claims Act would frustrate public policy.

The theory on which 'these rulings were based-that the allowance of the
deduction would be 'against public policy-was abruptly upset in Commissioner v. Tellier.79 There the Supreme Court allowed the deduction of legal
expenses incurred by a securities underwriter in the unsuccessful defense of
a prosecution for criminal violation of the securities and mail fraud laws. Mr.
Justice Stewart, writing for a -nanimous Court, said,
No public policy is offended when a man faced with serious criminal
charges employs a lawyer to help in his defense. That is not "proscribed
conduct." It is his constitutional right. . . . [Ilt is a basic of our public
policy0 that a defendant in a criminal case have counsel to represent
8

him.
In acquiescence to the Tellier case, the Internal 'Revenue Service adopted

the position that all legal expenses incurred in the defense either of a criminal
prosecution for violation of the antitrust laws or of a civil claim by'the United
States would be deductible. 8
.
Deductibility of Damages Paid
The deductibility of damages paid by the 'antitrust defendant, like 'the deductibility of legal expenses, has had -a vacillating' history. Early cases indi76. G.C.M. 24377, 1944 CUM. BULL. 93. G.C.M. 24377, and the cases upon which
it relied, is discussed in depth in Noall & Troxell, Tax Aspects of Antitrust Proceedings,
18 TAx L. Rnv.213, 213-25 (1963).
77. Rev. Rul. 62-175, 1962-2 CuM. BULL. 50. G.C.M. 24377 was held to have misread the cases upon which it relied. 1962-2 CuM. BULL. at 51. Since these underlying
cases involved the unsuccessful defense of civil actions, it is implicit in Rev. Rul. 62175 that legal expenses incurred in defending civil actions are deductible. It is also implicit in Rev. Rul. 62-175 that -the expenses of a successful defense of either a criminal
or civil action are deductible.
78. Rev. Rul. 64-224, 1964-2 CuM. BULL. 52.
79. 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
80. Id. at 694.
81. Rev. Rul. 66-330, .1966-2 CUM. BULL. 44. In Central Coat, Apron & Linen
Serv., Inc. v. United States, 298 F. Supp. 1201, 1206 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), a defense of criminal action under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the expenses incurred by a corporation
defending a corporate officer were also deductible. Had the legal expenses been deducted by the corporate officer himself, they would still have been deductible under the
Tellier doctrine. If the legal expenses had been paid by the corporation on behalf of
its officer, and the corporation itself was not a party to the -proceedings, it is possible
this would be considered a constructive dividend. The corporation- would receive no de-
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cated that damages paid to private claimants were properly deductible, 82
whereas damages paid to the United States were not.83 Similarly, recoveries
made by states pursuant to civil actions under state antitrust statues are nondeductible.8 4 The Internal Revenue Service subsequently changed its position, however, in Revenue Ruling 64-224. 85 On the theory that such payments are remedial in nature, the damages paid to private claimants were
held deductible by the defendant.8
.
Congressional liberals were outraged by what they termed a "tax -giveaway," primarily on the grounds that the allowance of such deductions violated public policy.8 7 The public policy objection was somewhat blunted by

the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner v. Tellier.8 8 Although the issue there was. the deductibility of legal expenses resulting from 'a criminal
conviction for securities fraud, a broad reading of the opinion seems to indicate the correctness of Revenue Ruling 64-224. The following language is
particularly significant:
Only where the allowance of a deduction would 'frustrate sharply
defined national or state policies proscribing particular types of conduct'
have we upheld its disallowance.... Further, the 'policies frustrated
must be national or state policies evidenced by some governmental dec-"
laration of them.'8 9

The Court indicated that this "governmental declaration" might be evidenced
by a specific disallowance of the deduction by an appropriate Code provision. 90 This statement was tied to a discussion of the proposed legislation
duction, but the officer would have income and a deduction in the same amount. See
G.C.M. 24377, 1944 CuM. BULL. 93, "To the extent that such expenses represent a payment on behalf of the individual defendants, they do not constitute ordinary and necessary business expenses."
82. See, e.g., International Shoe Co., 38 B.T.A. 81 (1938); cf. I.T. 3627, 1943 CuM.
BULL. 111 (treble damages paid to buyer under Emergency Price Control Act are deductible).,
83. Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 363 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 688 (1942) where the court remarked, "[W]e think it tolerably safe to say
that torts which are committed against the government and which are also violative of
the criminal statutes may not furnish the basis of deduction." Id. at 371.
84. Universal Atlas Cement Co., 9 T.C. 971 (1947), alrd, 171 F.2d 294 (2d Cir.
1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 936 (1949) (Texas antitrust statute),
85. 1964-2 CuM. BULL. 52. Amounts paid to the United States are not deductible.
Id. at 54.
86. Id. at 54.
87. See discussion in Boland, Income Tax Treatment of Antitrust Damages, 22 TAx
L. REv. 47, 52-54 (1966). Two of the most outraged were Senator Philip A. Hart,
Chairman of the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee, and Representative
Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary and its. antitrust
subcommittee.
88. 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
89.: Id. at 694 (Court's emphasis).
.90. Id. at 693. "[D]eduction of expenses falling within the general definition of
§ 162(a). -may, to be sure, be disallowed by specific legislation; since deductions 'are a
matter of grace and Congress can, of coursei disallow them as it chooses.'
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to limit the deduction of treble damage payments under the antitrust laws, 91
and the combined interpretation of these statements leads to the inference
that antitrust damage payments do not offend "sharply defined public
policy."
The debate was resolved somewhat by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, which
added the new section 162 (g) to the Code.9 2 The purpose of the section
is to deny a deduction of two-thirds of the treble damages for "hard-core violations."'9 3 Such hard-core violations are those in which the defendant has
pled guilty or nolo contendere, or is found guilty of criminal violations of the
94
antitrust laws.
There are five critical points in section 162(g). The first is the requirement of a criminal conviction, without which the statute does not consider
the violation to be "hard-core." The conviction need not be final, but if the
prosecution is discontinued or the defendant is ultimately acquitted, then a
deduction for damages paid is allowed. 95 Nor does the conviction have to
96
be previous in time to the damage payments sought to be deducted, and
the defendant gains no tax advantage by paying off private claimants before
the government begins criminal action. The Justice Department, which
determines whether or not criminal proceedings are to be instituted, can thus
effectively control the percentage of antitrust damage settlements that will
97
be deductible.
The second important point is the inclusion of nolo contendere pleas in
the statute. The main advantage of a plea of no contest is that it limits the
finding of defendant's guilt to that prosecution only and does not constitute
an admission for subsequent litigation. 98 It is also not prima facie evidence
91. Id. at 693 n.10.
92. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 902, 83 Stat. 711. The forerunner of section 162(g) was introduced by Senator Philip A. Hart in 1965 as a reaction
to Rev. Rul. 64-224. See discussion of Senator Hart's proposal in Boland, Income Tax
Treatment of Antitrust Damages, 22 TAX L. REV. 47, 52-62 (1970). See also Wright,
A Tax Formula to Restore the HistoricalEffects of the Antitrust Treble Damage Provisions, 65 MICH. L. REV. 245 (1966).
93. S.REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 274, 1969-3 CUM. BULL. 597.
94. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(g); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-22(a) (1972).
95. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-22(b) (1972).
96. Id. § 1.162-22(a)(2).

97. It has been pointed out that it is unlikely that the tax consequences to the violator would influence the Justice Department one way or the other in determining
whether or not criminal indictments are to be sought. See Taggart, Fines, Penalties,
Bribes and Damage Payments and Recoveries, 25 TAx L. REv. 611, 622 (1970).
98. See, e.g., Dalweld Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 252 F. Supp. 939, 941
(S.D.N.Y.

1966).

In A.B. Dick Co. v. Marr, 95 F. Supp. 83, 101 (S.D.N.Y.

1950),

the court said,
The general rule is that a plea of nolo contendere is no more than an implied admission solely for the purpose of the case in which the plea is made, and is not
admissible as an admission in a subsequent civil suit based on the same conduct.
See generally Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 1287 (1951).
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to be used by a private claimant. 99 Thus the nolo contendere plea is popular
because it saves both the government and the defendant time and expense
in conducting a criminal prosecution and does not have the additional consequences of a guilty plea or conviction. Whether or not the tax consequences now raised by a plea of nolo contendere will be determinative of
its future remains to be seen.
The new Code section also covers damage payments made to settle violations related to those for which the defendant was convicted. 100 The exact
perimeters of this area of "related violations" are vague. The regulations
seem to require not only a criminal conviction but also an injunction ordering
the defendant to stop its anticompetitive practice.' 0 1 If the anticompetitive
practice said to have injured a private claimant would fall within the scope
the violation is a related violation within the meaning
of the injunction, then
02
6
of section 1 2(g).1
The fourth vital point of section 162(g) is that the disallowance of the
deduction applies to settlements as well as judgments. 0 3 This treatment will
apply even though the antitrust cause of action was "dismissed or otherwise
disposed of. 1 0 4 Section 162(g) has been criticized because the cost of a
settlement will be increased by the tax effect, so the incentive to settle the
suit will be lessened.' 0 5 Further, since two-thirds of the settlement will be
allocated to treble damages by the statute even though the settlement will
often be less than the compensatory damages claimed, the wisdom of this
10 6
mandatory allocation must be questioned.
The final essential element of the new Code provision is the requirement
of filing an action.10 7 The critical factor on which the allowance or disallow99. Clayton Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1970).
100. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(g)(1), (2).

101. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-22(c)(1) (1972).
102. Id. § 1.162-22(c)(2). Apparently the determination of related violations will
have to be made on a case-by-case basis. See Taggart, Fines, Penalties, Bribes and
Damage Payments and Recoveries, 25 TAX L. REV. 611, 627 (1970).
103. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(g)(1), (2).
104. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-22(d) (1972). A related violation may even occur in a
period barred by limitations. See id. § 1.162-22 Ex. 2.
105. See Boland, Income Tax Treatment of Antitrust Damages, 22 TAx L. REv. 47,
61-62 (1966). But see Taggart, Fines, Penalties, Bribes and Damage Payments and Recoveries, 25 TAX L. REV. 611, 625-26 (1970); Wilberding, New Tax ConsiderationsInjected into Antitrust Treble Damage Proceedings, 19 U. KAN. L. REV. 441, 454 (1971).

106. If the antitrust defendant were allowed to deduct only one-third of its settlement
as the compensatory portion, the courts might consider this to mean that only one-third
of the plaintiff's recovery represents restitution and the remainder is taxable punitive
damages, even where the total award was less than the plaintiff's provable damages.
The net result of such a rule would be to penalize the plaintiff for the defendant's criminal conduct. No cases have been discovered which involve section 162(g), and its effect on the plaintiff remains to be seen.
107. "[N]o deduction shall be allowed .. .of any amount paid . . .in settlement
of any action brought under [the Clayton Act] .... ." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §
162(g) (2)(emphasis added). Presumably, the requirements of an action would be the
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ance of the deduction depends is the filing of a suit by the plaintiff. If the
plaintiff sues, the deduction is lost. This provision, then, encourages prompt
settlement of both the claimant's injury and unmeritorious claims brought by
unscrupulous claimants.' 0 8
The legislative history gives no clue to the reason for the action requirement, 10 9 and the logic of this requirement is obscure when viewed in conjunction with section 186, enacted as a companion to section 162(g). If the
plaintiff is to be benefited by the section 186 deduction, it must file suit or
lose the deduction. If this suit will cause the defendant to forfeit its deduction by operation of section 162(g), then the parties have reached a deadlock
that can properly be resolved only if the defendant offers to settle for an
amount great enough to offset the plaintiff's loss of its section 186 deduction
in exchange for the plaintiff's agreement not to file suit. To this extent,
sections 162(g) and 186 are in conflict.
Consequences of CriminalProceedings
A criminal conviction leads to tax consequences in addition to those of section 162(g). Since the decision in Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner,1 0 it has been clear that deductions for fines paid for violation of criminal statutes, even if inadvertent, will be disallowed on public policy
grounds. Thus, fines paid by corporations for antitrust violations are nondeductible, as are those paid by individual defendants."' -Payments by the
corporation of its officers' fines are not deductible by the corporation as additional compensation, but constitute a constructive dividend.11 2
State Antitrust Laws and Actions Thereunder
As an outgrowth of the trust busting era which saw the passage of the Sherman, Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts, many states enacted their
same as those of the companion section, section 186. See Treas. Reg. § 1.186-1(c)
(3)(i) (1972).
108. This potential aspect of section 162(g) has been characterized as blackmail:
While it may encourage early settlements, it could also lead to blackmail of sorts,
as potential defendants would be most anxious to prevent the filing of complaints,

even at the sacrifice of judicial supervision and the development of a formal record
on which to negotiate an equitable settlement.

Boland, Income Tax Treatment of Antitrust Damages, 22 TAx L. REV. 47, 60 (1966).
See also Taggart, Fines, Penalties,Bribes and Damage Payments and Recoveries, 25 TAX
L. REV. 611, 621 (1970).
109. See S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 273-74, 1969-3 CUM. BULL. 59697.
110. 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
111. Central Coat, Apron & Linen Serv., Inc. v. United States, 298 F. Supp. 1201,

1207 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (fine imposed under Sherman Act, section 1); Columbus Bread
Co., 4 B.T.A. 1126 (1926) (fine imposed under state antitrust laws).
112. Central Coat, Apron & Linen Serv., Inc. v. United States, 298 F. Supp. 1201,
1202 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). This would be the result even if the corporation were unindicted.
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own antitrust laws. 1 13 Most are modeled after their federal counterparts, so
fines paid to the state by the defendant had been held nondeductible even
1 14
before the Tank Truck Rentals decision.
Similarly, civil penalties paid to the states are also disallowed on public
policy grounds. In Universal Atlas Cement Co., 1 5 the State of Texas
brought a civil suit alleging violation of its antitrust provisions. The defendant denied its guilt but entered into a compromise agreement to settle the
action in order to conserve time and expense and to avoid negative publicity.
The settlement and the subsequent judgment specifically recited that they

were not to be construed as an admission of guilt. 1 6 Despite these stipulations, the Tax Court disallowed the claimed deduction. 117
A broad reading of Revenue Ruling 64-224118 would seem to reinforce the
decision in Universal Atlas Cement. Payments made to the United States
for violation of federal antitrust laws were held non-deductible in that revenue ruling on the grounds that they are "in effect punishment for injury to
the public occasioned by the violation of law." 119 Payments made to a state
pursuant to its antitrust statutes are clearly punishment; hence the language
of Revenue Ruling 64-224 would seem to include them.
There is also a question concerning the deductibility of legal expenses incurred as a result of actions by the states under their antitrust laws. These
expenses were held deductible in Longhorn Portland Cement Co.,1 0 but the
Internal Revenue Service has since announced it will no longer follow that
case.' 2 1 The Commissioner's nonacquiescence would now seem to be im113. E.g., TEX. Bus. &COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.01-15.34 (1968).
114. Columbus Bread Co., 4 B.T.A. 1126 (1926) (fines, penalties and court costs incurred in violation of Ohio antitrust statute).
115. 9 T.C. 971 (1947), aff'd, 171 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S.
936 (1949).
116. Section VII of the settlement provided:
This agreement is made by the parties hereto solely and only for the purpose of
compromising and settling the matters involved in this suit, by and between the
State of Texas, as plaintiff, and the defendants herein named, and it is expressly
understood and agreed as a condition hereof, that neither this agreement nor the
judgment to be entered thereon, nor any clause or provision of said agreement or
judgment, shall constitute or be construed to be an admission or estoppel as against
the various defendants herein as evidencing or indicating in any degree an admission of truth or correctness of the allegations in plaintiff's petitions contained in
whole or in part.
Id. at 973.
117. Id. at 976; accord, Commissioner v. Longhorn Portland Cement Co., 148 F.2d
276 (5th Cir)., cert. denied, 326 U.S. 728 (1945); Robert S. LeSage, 16 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 1079, 1083 (1947), rev'd on other grounds, 173 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1949) (guilt
denied in both answer and settlement; Texas antitrust laws).
118.

1964-2 CuM. BULL. 52.

119. Id. at 54.
120. 3 T.C. 310 (1944), rev'd on other grounds, 148 F.2d 276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 728 (1945). See generally Noall & Troxell, Tax Aspects of Antitrust
Proceedings, 18 TAX L. REv. 213, 217-19 (1963).
121. The Commissioner initially acquiesced on the deductibility of the legal expenses,
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material, however, in light of the Tellier decision. 122 Further, Revenue Ruling 66-330, which held that legal expenses resulting from criminal prosecutions by the United States are deductible, may be read to include state
3
prosecutions. 12
DIVESTITURES PURSUANT TO ANTITRUST ORDERS

In order that the anticompetitive practice complained of may be more effectively abated, courts have the power to order the defendant to divest itself
of certain assets or subsidiaries. 1 24 Examples of such orders include requiring
the defendant to sell products it formerly only leased"12 and forcing the defendant to divest itself of stock in another corporation. 1 26
The repeated contention that such court ordered divestitures are involuntary conversions has been rejected. 127 Such a court order lacks the element
of a taking for public use without consent on payment of a just compensation.' 28 If an involuntary conversion were to result from the forced sale,
the gain would be a capital gain and taxable at a lower rate. 29
Divestiture of stock by the defendant can have a devastating effect. The
defendant cannot ordinarily sell a block of stock it holds in another corporation without depressing the market for that security. The alternative, therefore, is to distribute the stock to its shareholders as a dividend in kind. The
fair market value of the stock on the date of distribution must be included
in gross income by the recipient." 30 By way of illustration, assume X
1944 CUM. BULL. 18, but has since withdrawn his acquiescence and now nonacquiesces.
1964-2 CuM. BULL. 8.

122. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966).

123. 1966-2 CuM. BULL. 44.
124. See Clayton Act §§ 15, 16, 15 U.S.C. §§ 25, 26 (1970).
125. See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 352 (D.
Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
126. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961).
127. Norton Co. v. United States, 196 F. Supp. 129, 133 (D. Mass. 1961); Rev. Rul.

58-11, 1958-1 CuM. BULL. 273 (divestiture of stock pursuant to antitrust order); Rev.
Rul. 55-717, 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 298 (divestiture of stock pursuant to state antitrust
laws).
Legislation was introduced in 1962 which would have included court-ordered divestitures in the definition of involuntary conversions as that term is used in section 1033.
Congress adjourned before the Sentate could act on the bill. However, the bill, as introduced, would have been of limited assistance to the violator because of the requirement
that the antitrust violation be inadvertent; further, it was required that the proceeds of
the forced sale be reinvested in similar property. This bill and its provisions is discussed
in Noall & Troxell, Tax Aspects of Antitrust Proceedings, 18 TAx L. REv. 213, 250

(1963).
128. See Rev. Rul. 58-11, 1958-1 CuM. BULL. 273. See also INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 1033, 1231.
129. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1231(a). The depreciation taken on the asset, if
any, would be subject to the recapture provisions of section 1245.
130. Id. §§ 301(c), 316.
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Corporation has purchased 15 percent of the outstanding stock of Y Corporation, and that both are large, publicly traded corporations. At the time the
Y stock was acquired, its market price was $60 per share. Some time later
the United States brings an antitrust action against X Corporation, alleging
that competition has been restrained by the acquisition of Y stock, and in
a consent decree X Corporation agrees to distribute its Y stock to X shareholders. When the distribution is made, the Y stock has appreciated in value
to $90. The shareholders of X Corporation must include in their gross income $90 for each share of Y received. In order to afford the additional
taxes X shareholders must pay because of their unsolicited receipt of Y
shares, they may have to sell some or all of the Y stock. If a large amount
of stock is involved, the market price of both X and Y issues may be substantially depressed. The burden of the antitrust laws may thereby be shifted
from X Corporation to Y Corporation and their respective stockholders. This
situation occurred in 1961 when duPont was ordered to sell all of its General
Motors stock. 13 1 Because of the possible consequences to the nation's
economy, Congress enacted special legislation to allow the dividend to be
treated as a return of capital rather than as a taxable dividend. 1 32 Although
not specifically so limited, in practice that provision applies only to the
duPont-General Motors transaction, and subsequent stock divestiture orders
133
will not have the benefit of this Code section.
There are also important tax consequences when the defendant is ordered
to sell property it previously only leased. In Continental Can Co. v. United
States,13 4 the Court of Claims held the gain on the sale of canning equipment
pursuant to a court order was taxable as ordinary income rather than as capital gain. In a vigorous dissent the minority felt that since the property was
not held for sale in the ordinary course of business, capital gains treatment
131. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961).
132.

INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1111.

133. Section 1111 applies only in those situations where an action was instituted by
the government prior to 1959 and a decree entered after 1960. Id. § 1111 (d).
134. 422 F.2d 405 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970). The same result
was reached on similar facts in American Can Co. v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 604 (2d
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 993 (1964). The dissenters in Continental Can distinguished American Can because in the latter all machines formerly leased were repossessed and returned to inventory before being sold and it reported all profits from machines sold as capital gains. Continental Can Company, however, allowed lessees to
retain possession and never transferred such equipment to inventory. Continental Can
Co. v. United States, 422 F.2d 405, 421 (Ct. Cl. 1970). Continental Can Company
also reported as capital gain only the profits made on those machines sold to lessees
in possession before the changeover date of the consent decree. Id. at 408.
There was also a considerable question raised as to whether or not American Can
had been overruled by the decision in Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569 (1966). The majority felt American Can had only been criticized but reached the proper result. Continental Can Co. v. United States, 422 F.2d 405, 413-14 (Ct. C1. 1970). The dissenters,
however, felt it had been overruled. Id. at 421.
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should have been allowed. 1 35 The critical points in controversy were whether
or not the canning machines were property held primarily for sale to customers, and whether or not such sales were made in the ordinary course of
business. If both criteria had been met, the equipment would not have constituted a capital asset; thus the gain would have been ordinary income.' 3 6
In Malat v. Riddell' 37 it had been held that "primarily," as used in the statute, "means 'of first importance' or 'principally'.' ' 138 Continental Can did
not hold the canning machines "principally" for sale to its customers; it only
leased its machines. 139 Moreover, it would not have sold the machines had
it not been ordered to do so. Because of this fact, the dissenters felt this
disposition was not made in the ordinary course of business. 40 The result
today might be somewhat different due to the provisions of section 1245,
which treats the gain realized in excess of the adjusted basis as ordinary income to the extent of depreciation taken.' 4' To the extent that the
sales
142
price exceeds the recomputed basis, however, the gain is a capital gain.
PROPOSED REFORMS

It is apparent that the tax laws have contributed to the inadequacies and
inequities in antitrust enforcement. The dichotomies of treatment afforded
the-antitrust plaintiff and defendant are based more often than not on illogical or imagined differences rather than on factual distinctions. The'use of
the tax laws for punishment is inconsistent with their intended function of
raising revenue and redistributing wealth; indeed, this position has143been
If
adopted by the Section on Taxation of the American Bar Association.
the penalties for antitrust violations are too small, then Congress should exercise its power and raise them. So that the basic thrust of the antitrust laws
may be restored, Congress should reform the present tax consequences for
violations.
135. Continental Can Co.'v. United States, 422 F.2d 405, 420 (Ct. Cl. 1970).

136.

INT. REv. CODEOF

1954, § 1221(1).

137. 383 U.S. 569 (1966).

138. Id. at 572.
139. Continental Can Co. v. United States, 422 F.2d 405, 407 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
140. "[Wlhen the taxpayer was forced to convey the equipment to its lessees by

court decree, this was not done in the ordinary course of business but in a most extraordinary way." Id. at 420.
141. Although Continental Can was decided in 1970, it dealt with taxable year 1951,

so the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 applied.
Section 1245 property is defined as that subject to an allowance for depreciation.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1245(a)(3). '. Further, section 1245 cuts across and takes
precedenceover all other provisions of the Code. Id. § 1245(d). This section.was not
enacted until 1962, so it Was of no assistance in deciding the Continental Can case.

142. The recomputed basis is calculated by adding all depreciation taken or other adjustments to basis made since June 30, 1963, to the adjusted basis of the asset. INT.
REv.CODE OF 1954, § 1245(a)(2)(B).
143. See Wright, A Tax Formula to Restore the Historical Effects of the Antitrust
Treble Damage Provisions, 65 MICH. L. REV. 245, 254 (1966).
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The Result of Glenshaw Glass Should be Reversed
Pre-Glenshaw Glass144 law held that punitive damages received as the result of litigation were tax-free. 145 Since treble damages are meant to be
remedial rather than punitive, 146 and were originally included in the Sherman
Act to encourage private actions, it would be consistent with the basic purposes of both the antitrust and the tax laws to exempt these additional damages from taxation. Although it is not possible to estimate the revenue loss
that would be associated with such an exemption, it would doubtlessly be
small. Since the trebled portion of the damages do much to restore the
former competitive prowess of the plaintiff, the eventual increased profits of
the plaintiff will more than make up for that revenue loss.
In addition to the attacks that may be made on the reasoning in Glenshaw
Glass and its faulty premise that treble damages are sufficiently analogous
to tort punitive damages to warrant taxation as income, there is a possibly
more cogent argument that Glenshaw Glass reached the wrong result. It is
apparent that the treble damages provision of the Clayton Act was meant
to encourage private litigation and make the resulting effort, expense and
gamble more worthwhile. But a tax which reduces the recovery increases
the effort, expense and risk factors in proportion to the plaintiff's tax bracket.
If the government wants to encourage private actions, it should provide that
the trebled portion of the recovery be tax free. Private actions have been
called "the most important pillar of antitrust enforcement;"'147 an appropriate
tax policy would strengthen that pillar.
Detractors might point to the availability of the government's previous
judgment which makes a prima facie case against the violator in a private
action; this might be considered incentive enough for the plaintiff to undertake to vindicate its injuries without the added tax encouragement. This
argument overlooks the fact that even if the plaintiff should be fortunate
enough to be aided by a prior government action, the prima facie case may
still be rebutted in the private suit.' 48 Moreover, the plaintiff must exhibit
144. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
145. See Central R.R. v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 697, 699 (3d Cir. 1935) (punitive
damages for breach of trust were non-taxable). But see Obear-Nester Glass Co. v.
Commissioner, 217 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1954).
146. Authorities cited note 29 supra.
147. Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANT=rUST
BULL. 167, 172 (1958). See also Wham, Antitrust Treble Damage Suits: The Government's Chief Aid in Enforcement, 40 A.B.A.J. 1061 (1954).
148. See Theater Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537,
542-43 (1954).
The resources of the Antitrust Division are not so vast that all antitrust violators are
brought to court. Further, on those that are, a substantial number will take a consent
decree or plead nolo contendere to avoid the expense and time involved in fighting the
antitrust action. Neither convictions based on nolo pleas nor consent decrees may be
used as prima facie evidence of a violation in subsequent private suits. Clayton Act,
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competent evidence to show not only that it sustained an injury as the result
of this violation, but also the extent of the injury. 149 For example, the result
of United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.' 50 showed that the private plaintiff may be unsuccessful even though the government was victorious. Forty
private suits were filed, but most of them were unsuccessful.'
The same
was true of the suits filed subsequent to the government's criminal convictions
against both General Motors and its financing subsidiary. 152 Thus, the advantage of the successful government action may turn out to be largely
15
illusory.'
This is not to say that the compensatory portion of the recovery should not
receive a just tax treatment. Lost profits and other recoveries that would
have been ordinary income to the plaintiff should still be treated as such.
Any other treatment would unjustifiably allow the plaintiff to convert ordinary income into something else. In keeping with the notion of properly taxing the compensatory third of the treble damage award, the Commissioner
and the courts must not be so ready to find that the taxpayer has received
ordinary income. Capital injuries do occur; where the taxpayer has made
its claim for an injury to goodwill and there is a valid indication of such,
the compensatory portion of the award should be allocated first to capital
recovery.
Similarly, the amount received by the taxpayer in a settlement should be
allocated first to capital recovery, then to lost profits, and finally to trebled
damages. This order of priority is suggested because the emphasis in antitrust policy, as it should be in tax policy, is to make the plaintiff whole again
and to restore its competitive position. Anything which cannot be justified
as being properly attributable to capital injury is next to be allocated to lost
profits. There should be an allocation to treble damages only if there is an
excess over the provable capital injury and the claimed lost profits. This is
based on ,the sound principle that ,the plaintiff will be most interested in
recouping its actual damages occasioned by the antitrust violation before profiting from it.
§ 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1970); Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340
U.S. 558 (1951).
149. See Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3

ANTITRUST

BULL. 167, 170 (1958).

150. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
151. See Comment, Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties: Analysis of Development in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1046-47 (1952).
152. United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941). The
subsequent private actions are discussed in Comment, Antitrust Enforcement by Private
Parties: Analysis of Development in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1048
(1952).
153. Admittedly, many defendants faced with the threat of private suits following a
successful government action will compromise with the private plaintiffs. Even so, the
plaintiff will in all likelihood still walk away with a settlement that represents less than
the damages actually sustained.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

23

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 6 [2022], No. 4, Art. 9

1975]

COMMENTS

Section 162(g) Should be Changed
Section 162(g) provides that a deduction for two-thirds of a settlement
or judgment will be disallowed to defendants who have previously been found
guilty of criminally violating the antitrust laws.' 5 4 The biggest problem with
this section is that it rests on a faulty premise. Its purpose is to punish hardcore violators by disallowing a deduction for two-thirds of the damages paid.
Necessarily implicit in this premise are the assumptions not only that all hardcore violators are prosecuted criminally, but also that only hard-core violators
are so prosecuted. This logical flaw could be in a large measure corrected
by taking the nolo contendere pleas out of the statute. Violators who have
inadvertently transgressed the antitrust laws, or who for other reasons do not
deserve the additional punishment from the tax laws, should be allowed to
plead no contest and still avoid the further tax penalty. The trial judge may
in his discretion accept or reject the plea, and his option may be properly
exercised by weighing the seriousness of the violation against the impact of
155
the tax laws.
Another situation where the nolo contendere plea should be allowed is
where the subsequent treble damage actions, made an even more serious
threat because of the disallowance of the deduction, could result in the bankruptcy of the defendant.' 56 In such extreme cases the real burden of the
5 7
violation would be borne by the innocent shareholders.
Present law allows the Justice Department to control the deductibility of
damages through its choice of civil or criminal prosecutions.15 8 Armed with
this power the Antitrust Division could conceivably use the threat of criminal
action and the subsequent disallowance of deductions to force the defendant
to take a consent decree, even though the defendant feels it has a valid defense. If the business of the Justice Department is obtaining consent decrees,
then this use of the tax laws is valid; if the business of the Justice Department
is to enforce the law, then this is fundamentally wrong and should be
changed.
154. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(g).
155. A defendant may plead nolo contendere only with the permission of the court.
FED. R. CriM. P. 11.
156. See Boland, Income Tax Treatment of Antitrust Damages, 22 TAx L. REV. 47,
60 (1966).
157. Strictly speaking, only the officers and emplovees of a corporation, not the corporation itself, can commit a crime or a tort. Stockholders may bring derivative actions
against those officers and directors who brought about the antitrust violations to recover
the fines and damages paid by the corporation on account of the illegal activities. See
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963). But if th2 violation
results in very large expenses incurred by the corporation, such as in Allis-Chalmers,
it is likely that the stockholders will be able to recover relatively little of the damages
before exhausting the personal fortunes of the culpable directors and officers.
158. See Boland, Income Tax Treatment of Antitrust Damages, 22 TAx L. REv. 47,
60 (1966); Taggart, Fines, Penalties, Bribes and Damage Payments and Recoveries, 25
TAx L. REv. 611, 622 (1970).
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Even if the violator is criminally convicted, it may nonetheless circumvent
the statute and be entitled to the deduction if it settles with the claimant before a civil action is filed. Although this provision would seem to reach a
desirable policy goal, encouraging the violator to settle before subjecting the
claimant to the expense and trouble of a lawsuit, there is no logical justification for treating settlements before suit is filed differently from those settled
after the institution of an action. The allowance or disallowance of a deduction should not be based on such an artificial distinction any more than it
should be in section 186.
The reasoning of the statute is also faulty when it assumes that two-thirds
of an out of court settlement represents punitive damages. It has already
been noted that the plaintiff will emphasize its actual damages, and probably
few, if any, antitrust settlements include an amount intended to represent
treble damages. This allocation rule becomes even harsher when the combined tax effects on both the plaintiff and the defendant are considered. Assuming that the plaintiff gets a judgment for three times its actual damages,
and the plaintiff is aided in its case by a prior criminal conviction of the
defendant, present law woud make plaintiff include two-thirds of the award
in gross income and would deny defendant a deduction. In effect, the same
money would be taxed twice.
At the very least, section 162(g) should be amended to cure its deficiencies in logic. It was originally introduced in objection to Revenue Ruling
64-224,119 and the tax law is no place for statutes founded on outrage.
CONCLUSION

No matter what changes are made in the income tax laws to bring them
more fully into harmony with antitrust policy, the plaintiff will still incur
hardships which cannot be corrected through tax policy. These hardships,
in themselves an effective deterrent to private litigation, must not be coupled
with a tax policy that compounds the palintiff's burden. It would therefore
be a proper exercise of legislative power to enact a program which would
encourage private parties to aid the government in antitrust enforcement. The
purpose of the antitrust laws is to encourage competition and thereby stimulate the economy to greater productivity; since one of the purposes of the
revenue laws is economic stimulation and regulation, a sound tax policy
would be an appropriate way for Congress to encourage private enforcement.
The antitrust violator should also be given the benefit of an equitable tax
policy. Appropriate deductions should be allowed to clearly reflect income
rather than distort it because of politically inspired fictions. These proposed
reforms will be fair to victim and violator alike and encourage private enforcement of the antitrust laws.
159. 1964-2 CuM. BULL. 52.
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